"molecular taxonomy" and traditional taxonomy, based on phenotypes, were both essential to the study of biodiversity. He decried, however, the decline in traditional taxonomy, which he attributed to policies fostered by portions of the scientific community to take advantage of funding. Notwithstanding the disappointment that traditional taxonomists must feel at the prospect of competition with molecular taxonomists for resources, it might be argued that Boero (2010) stepped over a line by deeming the motive of molecular taxonomists to be to run away with the money. Although it is dangerous to attribute motive to any of a number of human foibles, Boero attributed it to both malice and stupidity. The debate about the efficacy of both approaches is not new (e.g., Cronin 1993 , Hebert and Gregory 2005 , and neither is the suggestion that different approaches could prove complementary (e.g., Hajibabaei et al. 2007 ). Those of us observing the fight from ringside, then, may wonder why it has not abated.
We might wonder, too, whether this debate serves conservation in the longer term. It underscores that, although the concept of "species" (and, by extension, "designatable units" below species; the Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada (COSEWIC) 2009a) is written into laws and policies, the concept remains as hard to grasp as a greased pig at a fall fair. Consequently, it is vulnerable to abuse as a basis for conservation advocacy (O'Brien and Mayr 1991, Geist 1992 , but see Green 2005) . Unfortunately-and notwithstanding the precautionary principle-when scientists are uncertain, the reaction by decision makers is sometimes to take no action, opting instead to exercise precaution against the loss of the status quo rather than side with an entity that may or may not constitute an eligible taxonomic unit according, for example, to COSEWIC (2009b).
When it comes to conservation, however, proponents of both approaches may be off the mark when they imply that finely resolved inventories are essential to conservation in any case. Taxonomists who adopt that position have had some high-level help. Perhaps, as Boero (2010) suggests, because the idea to name all species dates to the Book of Genesis, taxonomists indeed feel they are on a mission from God to inventory species. Another influential document, the Convention on Biological Diversity, also laid out what appears to be widely accepted as the order in which the steps to conserve biological diversity are to be taken. (Johnson 1993:85) ; that is, inventory, monitor, and assess. Whether it is appropriate to inventory in the absence of clear questions or hypotheses about activities alleged to have adverse impacts is another example of the broader debate about whether-to advance scientific understanding of a problem-it is better that data collection or the formulation of hypotheses comes first (Villard and Nudds 2009) , an issue revisited recently in the context of the human genome project and apparently not resolved there either (e.g., Golub 2010 , Weinberg 2010 .
To what extent is it important that we name a taxonomic unit anyway? Ecologists who study birds, unlike soil microbial ecologists for example, are unlikely ever to be relieved of the "tyranny" of Linnaean taxonomy, and free instead to identify and monitor adverse impacts on the diversity and abundance of entities as bland as Operational Taxonomic Units defined by some universally acceptable percent sequence divergence. But would it be so bad? Are groups of individuals discovered to comprise cryptic species (e.g., Kerr et al. 2007 
